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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES
Administrative and Expert Monitoring of Interna-
tional Treaties. Edited by Paul C. Szasz. Ardsley
NY: Transnational Publishers, 1999. Pp. xiii,
270. Index. $115.
International legal scholars, as well as those in
other disciplines, of late have been particularly
interested in issues of implementation, compli-
ance, and effectiveness. Witness, for example,
the American Society of International Law's
sponsorship of a three-year, interdisciplinary
project on compliance with nonbinding interna-
tional instruments.' For international lawyers,
this territory is somewhat uncharted, occupying
something of a middle ground between the
much more frequently explored areas of norm
creation and dispute settlement. This upsurge of
interest in nonbinding instruments reflects the
realization by international lawyers and others
that legal rules, however ambitious on paper,
have little or no impact absent implementation.
At the same time, since the nature of multilateral
relationships is such that formal disputes may be
rare, and binding third-party processes less com-
mon still, dispute settlement processes, however
powerful in theory, may well be poor vehicles for
assuring widespread compliance.
The presentvolume treats monitoring as a sub-
set of this array of concerns about compliance.
The bulk of the work, framed by an introduction
by editor Paul Szasz, consists of analyses of two or
three topics in each of three broad categories of
international treaty regimes: human rights, the
environment, and nuclear safety and arms con-
trol. The eight case studies reproduced in this
work, prepared by fellows of the New York Uni-
versity Center for International Studies, provided
the principal documentation for a 1996 confer-
ence at the NYU School of Law (with this reviewer
in attendance). Included as appendices are key-
note presentations by Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, the
World Bank's former senior vice president and
general counsel, and by the late Ambassador Win-
fried Lang of Austria.
Monitoring, which is defined by Lang as an
examination of "[t]he actual behavior of states
1See COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF
NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2000) (reviewed by
Douglas M.Johnston, 95 AJIL (forthcoming 2001)); see
also ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLI-
ANCE wTrH INTERNATIONAL ENvIRONmENTAL AccoRDs
(Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K.Jacobson eds., 1998);
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIvENEss OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTIcE (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, & Eugene B.
Skolnikoff eds., 1998).
vis-ii-vis their obligations ... by means of collect-
ing data [and] screening national reports" (p.
255), emphasizes the assembly and evaluation of
information. Viewed in this light, and as high-
lighted by Lang, monitoring is distinct from
compliance or, in French, contr6le. Disarmament
is perhaps the field in which monitoring, or the
closely associated concept of verification, is most
familiar. There the relationship to compliance is
readily evident. For obvious reasons, parties to
multilateral arms control agreements have a sig-
nificant interest in obtaining information con-
cerning the activities of other states-monitor-
ing-for the purpose of assuring the adequacy of
performance of obligations-compliance. The
absence of such information may encourage de-
fections by individual states uncertain of compli-
ance by others, with a destabilizing or centrifugal
effect on the integrity of the entire regime.
The framework or template for the volume's
case studies is set forth in Szasz's introduction.
He elaborates on the component functions of
monitoring, including the collection of informa-
tion through fact-finding or reporting, and the
evaluation of the significance of that informa-
tion-both of which may be undertaken either
by neutral experts or by representatives of states.
The supervisory machinery of the International
Labour Organization, which might itself have
been an excellent subjectfor one of the volume's
case studies, is identified as an early example of
monitoring. In clarifying just what monitoring is
and is not, Szasz notes that the World Trade
Organization's dispute settlement apparatus is
fundamentally different in purpose from moni-
toring. The goal of monitoring is not to sanction
violations, but to assist states "to improve and en-
hance compliance with treaty obligations" (p. 15).
In what is in itself a significant contribution,
the case studies set out the structures, proce-
dures, and mechanisms for monitoring a variety
of multilateral treaties and related instruments.
In some areas, such as the environmental agree-
ments treated in the book, much of this informa-
tion has not previously been collected in such a
systematic fashion. In addition, the case studies
generally contain historical and anecdotal mate-
rial, potentially of precedential significance, de-
scribing how the regime has operated to date.
For instance, Allisonjernow describes UN-spon-
sored on-site country missions to monitor human
rights in Cambodia, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
The individual chapters are, by and large, care-
fully executed, detailed, comprehensive, and
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well documented. The reader obtains a good
sense of the practical, real-world considerations
surrounding multilateral monitoring.
The case studies, particularly when read as a
whole, offer larger lessons. For instance, it be-
comes apparent that the identity of those engag-
ing in monitoring may have a crucial impact on
the character and ultimate success of that pro-
cess. The most obvious distinction is between in-
structed representatives of governments, on the
one hand, and independent experts appointed
in their personal capacities, on the other.
Monica Washington's essay on monitoring com-
pliance with nuclear safety standards is perhaps
the most insightful in this regard. Analyzing the
significance of peer review by operators of nu-
clear installations from other states, she tren-
chantly identifies the pivotal transformation by
which "[p] olitics is supplanted by technical con-
siderations and international experts become
quasi-ambassadors" (p. 213). Other constituen-
cies besides governmental representatives and
independent experts may also perform signifi-
cant functions with respect to monitoring. The
now familiar role of civil-society and nongovern-
mental organizations receives careful attention
in SashaThomas-Nuruddin's case study concern-
ing stratospheric ozone.
The integration of themes and the synthesis of
results always present challenges in volumes in
which case studies are central. In Administrative
and Expert Monitoring of International Treaties, the
authors of the individual case studies present
larger and important insights that move the anal-
ysis beyond the scope of a single treaty regime.
For example, R. Andrew Painter identifies a sys-
temic dynamic when he observes that in the hu-
man rights field, "[m ] erely seeking cooperation
[via monitoring] often results in state inaction.
However, excessive confrontation risks state non-
participation or even resistance" (p. 49). None-
theless, the keynote presentation by Lang is the
only serious effort to synthesize the case studies
into crosscutting lessons from the various treaty
systems. He analyzes how monitoring differs
from other functions, such as compliance-con-
trol, implementation, application, supervision,
and surveillance. He concludes with the some-
what deflating observation that "[c]ompliance-
control/monitoring in respect of disarmament
and environmental treaties have little in com-
mon" (p. 258).
Shihata's presentation on the World Bank's
role in each of the three areas under study is a
bit off the topic but enriches the work nonethe-
less. He points to the bank's support of the en-
vironment and of economic, social, and cultural
rights through its mainstream portfolio and such
specialized trust funds as the Global Environ-
ment Facility. Otherwise, he stresses the limita-
tions on the bank's functional mandate as en-
shrined in its Articles of Agreement, which sup-
posedly prevent the bank from imposing condi-
tionality based on such factors as a borrowing
country's military expenditures and its record in
the area of civil and political rights. Although
one can trace similar themes back nearly a de-
cade in the public statements of this important
figure,2 during that same period the bank's insti-
tutional agenda has changed dramatically. The
impediments identified by Shihata have been
largely irrelevant to major institutional reforms
by the bank in such areas as the environment,
which have been driven primarily by policy, and
not legal, considerations.
If the reader is left with a lingering sense of a
lack of fulfillment from this book, it is precisely
with respect to the question that editor Szasz
identified at the outset: to what extent does mon-
itoring, and the methods by which that function
is performed, make a difference in real-world
outcomes? In all fairness, expecting an answer to
such a question is arguably an unrealistic expec-
tation from a book compiled by those trained in
international law, a discipline largely devoted to
normative pronouncements and whose predic-
tive capacity is low. Explaining the real-world im-
pact of international regimes is perhaps best left
to another day and to other disciplines. At that
time, economists, natural scientists, and interna-
tional relations theorists will be able to consult
Administrative and Expert Monitoring of Interna-
tional Treaties as an essential work on the struc-
ture and functioning of international oversight
mechanisms.
DAVID A. WIRTH
Boston College Law School
Human Rights in Global Politics. Edited by Tim
Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xi, 328.
Index. £42.50, cloth; £15.95, paper.
The fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights in 1998, coming in the
decade after the resurgence of Western-style
liberal democracies, has generated much writing
2 See, e.g., Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Remarks, 82 ASIL
PROC. 41 (1988).
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